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THEORIES OF LIABILITY UNDER CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURE
REDEMPTION NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
When an investor' purchases a debenture2 he obtains a security3 which
entitles him to receive a fixed interest on the face amount of the debenture
until it matures and if the corporation calls in its debenture prior to maturity,
the investor also receives a premium. 4 If the debenture is also convertible, it
affords the investor the additional option, at some date prior to redemption,
of converting his debenture for a certain number of shares in the issuing
corporation.5 In order to take advantage of this conversion privilege the
investor must be informed if the corporation calls in its debentures for
redemption. Since the redemption period is relatively short, extending for only
thirty days in some instances, 6 there is a danger that notice will not be
received so as to enable the holder to convert before the expiration of the
conversion privilege (which may precede the date of redemption). If this
occurs, the investor loses his right of conversion, 7 as well as the associated
potential financial gain. 8 Failure to convert because of the lack of notice of the
1. For a discussion of the types of investors who are attracted to convertible securities and
why, see 1 A. Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 270-71 (5th ed. 1953).
2. A debenture differs from a bond in that a debenture is a debt secured by the general credit
of the corporation while a bond is secured by specific property of the debtor corporation. H.
Guthmann & H. Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 204 (4th ed. 1962).
3. A security as defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is "any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
1.. " 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
4. See W. Cary, Corporations 974 (4th ed. 1970).
5. See, e.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. CL
364 (1975) ('The debentures were to pay interest of 4 per cent per annum and were to be
convertible by the debenture-holder into common stock at a rate (subject to adjustment) of two
shares per $100 principal amount of debentures."); Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., (1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,456, at 92,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kaplan v.
Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Although there may be instances when
debentures are made convertible at the option of the issuer, W. Cary, Corporations 978 (4th ed.
1970), litigation discussed in this Note arises when the option to convert is preempted by the
issuers right to redeem.
6. E.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364
(1975) (30 days); Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L
Rep. 93,456, at 92,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (33 days); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212,
213 (N.D. I. 1971) (30 days). The length of the redemption period is nieasured from the date on
which the first notice concerning redemption is published to the date on which the debentures are
to be redeemed.
7. Note, Convertible Securities: Holder Who Fails to Convert Before Expiration of'the
Conversion Period, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 271, 274 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cornell Note].
8. Id. at 271. "During a four-month period in 1967, the conversion rights of holders of
convertible securities having a face value of $1,313,000 were terminated by redemptions. Since
the stock into which these securities could have been converted had a market value of well over
three million dollars, the holders suffered a loss in excess of $1,700,000." Id. In Van Gemert v.
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redemption call, destroys the advantageous qualities9 of the debentures for
the investor ° and as a result, litigation instituted by aggrieved investors has
often focused upon the adequacy of the notice provided by the issuing
corporation. I I
In addition to a cause of action arising from breach of the covenants of the
issuing corporation contained in the indenture, corporate liability for failure
to give sufficient notice of an impending redemption may be predicated on
three theories. 12 First, the plaintiff may allege that the redemption notice did
not meet the standards set forth in the listing agreement 13 entered into by the
issuing corporation and the stock exchange. A cause of action may thus be
implied under federal law on the theory that the exchange rule, qua listing
agreement, 14 violated was "an extension of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and an integral part of the statutory scheme under which exchanges are
required to adopt rules . . . . "I Second, it may be alleged that, not-
Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975), the total loss alleged
by fifty-six investors was over $2,000,000.
On a smaller scale, one court was faced with a suit brought by an individual investor to recover
$35,049. In that case the selling price of the stock he would have received upon conversion was
$45,424 while the amount he actually did receive was only $10,375-paid by the company for the
bonds at their redemption. Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,456, at 92,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
9. 1 A. Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 268-71 (5th ed. 1953); H. Guthmann &
H. Douga], Corporate Financial Policy 213 (4th ed. 1962); see A Hard-Nosed Look at Con-
vertible Bonds, Financial World, June 28, 1972, at 7; Brigham, An Analysis of Convertible
Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, 21 J. Finance 35, 50, 54 (1966); Convertible
Bonds and Stocks, Financial World, October 10, 1973, at 7; Convertible Bonds Back in Favor,
Financial World, April 21, 1971, at 4; Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 547, 555-60 (1975); Melicher, Convertible Securities: A Renewed Interest, MSU
Business Topics, Summer 1971, at 52-53; Miller, Convertible Exchange Offers--Everyone Can
Win, Financial Executive, Feb. 1974, at 25-29; Should You Convert to Convertibles?, Forbes,
Oct. 15, 1974, at 49.
10. Perhaps the most attractive quality is the possibility of financial gain through the exercise
of the conversion privilege. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
11. E.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
364 (1975); Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,456, at 92,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. UIl.
1971).
12. It has been suggested that there might possibly be another claim for liability based upon
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 aaa-bbbb (1970). Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,
520 F.2d 1373, 1385 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975). The appellants in Van Gemert
also contended that the indenture was an adhesion contract because of the disparate bargaining
powers of the parties involved. Id. at 1380. This thedry was advanced in Cornell Note, supra
note 7, at 272-73.
13. A company that wishes its securities to be traded on a national stock exchange must file a
listing application with both the exchange and the SEC. As a result of this application process, a
Listing Agreement is formulated between the exchange and the company. See H. Guthmann &
H. Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 390 (4th ed. 1962).
14. But see note 79 infra and accompanying text.
15. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364
(1975).
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withstanding the indenture or the listing agreement, the notice of the
redemption call was neither proper nor sufficient. Finally, the plaintiff may
allege that he, as an investor who purchased debentures from the issuing
corporation, is a third party beneficiary of the listing agreement between the
corporation and the exchange.
A recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Van Geraert v. Boeing
Co., 16 illustrates the problems raised by the notification procedure. In 1958,
Boeing offered its shareholders one hundred dollar convertible debentures
that matured July 1, 1980. The indenture provided that if the debenture was
called by the corporation prior to maturity, the holder was entitled to convert
up to and including the tenth day prior to the redemption date. The indenture
further provided that the corporation furnish the holder of a called security
with" 'not less than 30 nor more than 90 days' prior notice.' "17 Publication in
an authorized newspaper constituted sufficient notice. On the other hand,
Boeing's listing agreement with the NYSE provided that the company
would publish immediately "any action taken . . . with respect to ...any
rights or benefits pertaining to the ownership of its securities listed on the
Exchange... and will afford the holders of its securities ... a proper period
within which . . . to exercise their rights."' 8
In 1966, Boeing decided to recall the debentures, setting April 8th as the
redemption date with the conversion privilege expiring ten days earlier, on
March 29th. On February 28, 1966 a press release was given to the financial
editors of the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Wall Street
Journal and other national newspapers, in addition to the major wire services.
However, this press release did not contain the dates of redemption or of the
expiration of the conversion privilege. On March 8th and 18th, notice, in the
form of advertisements, appeared in the Wall Street Journal. Still, on March
25th, four days before the end of the conversion period, over one-half of the
outstanding debentures remained unconverted. At that time a second press
release was issued containing the redemption date and the conversion
expiration date which the first had lacked. On March 28th, the company
republished its earlier advertisements in all the editions of the Wall Street
Journal and the New York Times. Fifty-six investors, holding debentures
worth one and one-half million dollars on their face and four million dollars
upon conversion, failed to convert their debentures by the redemption date.
Following the loss of their option, plaintiff investors instituted a dass action
against Boeing, alleging that the corporation had provided them with
insufficient notice. Boeing had, in fact, complied with the notice requirements
of the indenture1 9 but had failed to do so with regard to the applicable
provisions of the listing agreement. 20
16. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. CL 364 (1975).
17. Id. at 1376 (emphasis deleted).
18. Id. (emphasis deleted).
19. The Indenture, a 113 page booklet, provided in part:" 'In case the Company shall desire to
exercise the right to redeem all or any part of the debentures.. . it shall publish prior to the date
fixed for redemption a notice of such redemption at least twice in an Authorized Newspaper, the
first such publication to be not less than 30 days and not more than 90 days before the date fixed
for redemption. Such publication shall be in successive weeks but on any day of the week.' "
1976]
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IE. IMPLIED FEDERAL CIVIL LIABILITY
The Securities Exchange Act of 193421 imposed a broad self-regulatory
scheme upon registered stock exchanges under which such exchanges could,
subject to the supervisory and limited coercive control of the SEC, make and
enforce their own rules. 22 The rules so promulgated provide for disciplinary
measures for members23 who do not abide by "just and equitable principles of
trade. ' 24 The Act provides further that the federal district courts "shall have
Id. "An 'Authorized Newspaper' is defined as one published at least five days a week and of
general circulation in the borough of Manhattan, N.Y." Id. at 1376 n.6.
20. See note 128 infra. The NYSE Company Manual specifically defines what is meant by
publicity in the listing agreement: "Publicity- the term 'publicity' . . . as used in the listing
agreement in respect of redemption action, refers to a general news release, and not to the formal
notice or advertisement of redemption sometimes required by provisions of an indenture or
charter.
"Such news release shall be made as soon as possible after taking corporate action which will
lead to, or which looks toward redemption, or as soon as possible after the company acquires
knowledge of any such action taken by others, and shall be made by the fastest available means.
The 'fastest available means' may vary in individual cases and according to the time of day.
Ordinarily, this requires a release to the public press by telephone, telegraph, or hand delivery, or
some combination thereof. Transmittal of such a release to the press solely by mail Is not
considered satisfactory. Similarly, release of such news exclusively to the local press outside of
New York City would not be sufficient for adequate and prompt disclosure to the investing
public.
"To insure adequate coverage, releases requiring immediate publicity should be given to Dow
Jones & Company, Inc., to Reuters Economic Services, and to Associated Press and United Press
International. These releases should also be given to one or more of the newspapers of general
circulation in New York City which regularly publish financial news." NYSE Company Manual
§ A-10, at A-170 (1971). In Van Gemert, the defendant did not notify the NYSE as soon as It
knew it was going to make a redemption call, nor did it publish a general news release. 520 F.2d
at 1377. But Boeing did publish notices of the dates of the call and the expiration of the
redemption option in, "NYSE ticker on March 8, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 28, 1966; NYSE Bulletin on
March 11, 18 and 25, 1966; The Commercial and Financial Chronicle on March 14, 21 and 28,
1966; Standard & Poor's Bond Outlook on March 19, 1966; Standard & Poor's Called Bond
Record on March 9, 11, 18 and 25, 1966; Moody's Industrials on March 11, 1966. Articles about
these dates were also carried in the Seattle Post Intelligencer on March 25, 1966; the Seattle
Times on March 27, 1966; and the Financial World on March 23, 1966; and the notice was also
carried in the Associated Press Bond Tables published . . . in major cities across the United
States." Id. at 1378-79. Yet most of these notices were in fine print and buried in the midst of a
multitude of information and financial markets, "scarcely of a kind to attract the eye of the
average lay investor or debenture holder." Id. at 1379.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
22. Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 825, 826 (1970).
23. A member of the exchange is "any person who is permitted either to effect transactions on
the exchange without the services of another person acting as broker, or to make use of the
facilities of an exchange for transactions thereon without payment of a commission or fee or with
the payment of a commission or fee which is less than that charged the general public .... " 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3) (1970).
24. Id. § 78f(b) (1970). In addition, the exchange may adopt and enforce any rules not
inconsistent with the Act, as long as the rules are adequate to "insure fair dealing and to protect
investors." Id. § 78f(c),(d) (1970).
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exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder. '2
5
The Act raises two questions with respect to a rules violation of a stock
exchange duly registered under the AcLt s The first, and perhaps the most
important, is whether a violation of an exchange rule comes within the
jurisdictional provisions of the Act. Traditionally, courts have treated such
rules violations as giving rise to federal jurisdiction by implication. 2 7 Since
there is no reference to exchange rules in the grant of jurisdiction under the
1934 Act, congressional intent is hard to decipher. One view has been that a
violation of stock exchange rules is covered by the "arising under" provisions
of the jurisdictional grant of the Act.28 Another view relies upon the words
"a duty created by this chapter" to imply jurisdiction. 29 Both views stretch
the language of section 27 of the Act3" and both have met with criticism. 3 I
Yet, most actions alleging a claim based upon a violation of stock exchange or
dealer association rules3 2 have sought to imply civil liability from the ju-
risdictional provisions of the 1934 AcL 33
25. Id. § 78aa (1970).
26. See Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member Liability for Violation of Stock
Exchange Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120, 1126-33 (1970); Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for
Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 825, 832-41 (1970).
27. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Vells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1000-01 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
28. Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock
Exchange Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120, 1128 (1970).
29. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
30. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
31. Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange
Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120, 1128 (1970); Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of
Stock Exchange Rules, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 825, 834-35 (1970). The author of the Harvard Note
believed that section 27, which grants jurisdiction to the federal courts, does not support federal
jurisdiction based upon a violation of stock exchange rules. Id. at 833-34. "Because there is no
federal duty on members to obey exhange rules, a rule violation does not entail a violation of the
Act or a duty created by it. While an exchange rule might abstractly be thought a 'rule . . .
thereunder,' other provisions of the Act expressly distinguish exchange rules from 'rules thereun-
der.' Thus, in order to find jurisdiction under section 27, 'created by' must be read to mean
'having its ultimate origin in.' While this reading is possible, it is a stretch of the language." Id. at
834 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, the authors of the California article believed that it is
not clear that the interpretation of "arising under" is any less strained than that of "created
by." 58 Calif. L. Rev. at 1128. "Moreover, although a member's liability for violation of a stock
exchange rule is created by implication, it is so closely related to the purpose of the 1934 Act that
it would be anomalous to hold that such liability is not 'created by' the Act.... [1]f the action is
considered to arise under the 1934 Act, it is also 'created by' that Act since in either case the
genesis of the action is found in the 1934 Act. This conclusion is clearly the most sensible
interpretation." Id. at 1128-29 (footnote omitted).
32. CCH NASD Manual 2001-2401 (Rules of Fair Practice).
33. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 164 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 416 U.S. 960
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The court in Van Gemert avoided this issue, however, and accepted
jurisdiction over a similar claim on the basis of pendent jurisdiction.3 4
Implicit in the court's consideration was the finding of a common nucleus of
operative facts between the federal claim, which was based on alleged
violations of the 1934 Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 35 and the state claim, which was based upon violation of the
rules of the NYSE. 36 This was a novel approach for a case involving an
alleged violation of stock exchange rules. It is also preferable to implying
jurisdiction from the 1934 Act since a federal court does not have to stretch
the language of the 1934 Act in order to assume jurisdiction.3" Yet a litigant
proceeding on a theory of pendent jurisdiction should not be guaranteed
access to federal court merely by alleging failure to abide by or to enforce
stock exchange or dealer association rules. The decision rests upon the
discretion of court that must consider "judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants" and should avoid needless decisions of state law.
38
The second question raised by the 1934 Act is whether, having found
jurisdiction, violations of certain rules of a stock exchange or dealer
association are, of themselves, so tied to the statutory scheme of the 1934 Act
as to enable a court to grant relief based upon a theory of implied federal civil
liability. The difficulty with this theory of liability is that "the effect and
significance of particular [stock exchange] rules may vary with the manner of
their adoption and their relationship to provisions and purposes of the [1934
Act]."'39 Difficulties arise in determining the scope of the unique statutory
scheme of" 'supervised self-regulation' " promulgated by stock exchange and
dealer association rules.
40
(1974); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972);
Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Schonholtz v. American Stock
Exch. Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-92 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 505 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1974); Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Bush v. Bruns
Nordeman & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 93,674, at 93,007
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. 520 F.2d at 1382. Pendent jurisdiction arises when there are two claims for relief, one
federal and one state, and both claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts and
would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding. When these facts are present,
federal courts may hear the state claim as a result of its relationship to the federal claim, even
though the federal claim may not be actionable. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966); C.
Wright, Federal Courts 63-65 (2d ed. 1970). Compare Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
35. 520 F.2d at 1374.
36. See id. at 1375.
37. See note 31 supra.
38. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v.
Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285, 292 (1963).
39. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817 (1966).
40. Id. See generally Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer for
Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 253 (1970).
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Two tests have been applied to determine whether a violation of certain
stock exchange or dealer association rules will give rise to implied federal civil
liability.41 The first, set forth in Colonial Realty Co. v. Bache & Co., 4 2
emphasizes the nature of the particular stock exchange rule and its place in
the federal regulatory scheme. 43 In that case, a customer brought an action
against a securities broker for alleged violations of the 1934 Act and of the
rules of the NYSE requiring that members of the exchange not engage in
conduct inconsistent with fair and equitable principles of trade. The court
reasoned that in order to find implied federal civil liability based upon a
violation of a stock exchange rule, the regulation in question would have to be
an extension of the design of the 1934 Act. The implication that a particular
rule is such an extension will be strongest under this test when the rule
violated imposes an explicit duty unknown to common law. For example,
NYSE rule 452 prohibits, in certain instances, members "from voting stock
held in a street name without specific instructions from the beneficial own-
er.""4 Such a rule "could thus play an integral part in SEC regulation
notwithstanding the Commission's decision to take a back-seat role in its
promulgation and enforcement .... " and is not merely an exchange
housekeeping rule.45
The second test, as announced in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 4 6 is whether the particular stock exchange rule violated was
designed "for the direct protection of investors." 47 In that case, a trustee in
41. There has been considerable debate as to which test is appropriate. See, e.g., Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 166 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Piper, Jaffray &
Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Hoblin, A Stock Broker's
Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39
Fordham L. Rev. 253, 258-68 (1970); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and
NASD Rules, 47 Denver L.J. 63, 66-71 (1970); Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under
SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 Ala. L. Rev. 15, 48-50, 56-58 (1969); Comment, Implied
Civil Liability Arising from Violation of the Rules of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, 8 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 151, 157-67 (1975); 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 388, 390-94 (1972).
42. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
43. Id. at 182. The court held that in the particular fact pattern presented to it-member
violating a stock exchange rule-violations of stock exchange rules should not give rise to implied
federal civil liability. Id. at 183. Yet the court, in dicta, stated that "join the other hand, we
cannot ignore that the concept of supervised self-regulation is broad enough to encompass a rule
which provides what amounts to a substitute for regulation by the SEC itself.... A particular
stock exchange rule could thus play an integral part in SEC regulation notwithstanding the
Commission's decision to take a back-seat role in its promulgation and enforcement...." Id. at
182.
44. Id. at 182 n.4; see 2 CCH NYSE Guide 2452 (1962). Compare Starkman v. Seroussi,
377 F. Supp. 518, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (NYSE Rules 345.19 & 405).
45. 358 F.2d at 182 (dictum). The Colonial court also found that the party seeking implication
of federal civil liability should bear a heavier burden of persuasion than when a federal statute or
SEC regulation is violated. Id. Moreover, it seems that a major concern in Judge Friendly's
opinion is that the implication of federal civil liability would in the case of most rule violations
merely duplicate state negligence law. See id. at 182-83.
46. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
47. Id. at 142; see Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66
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bankruptcy sued the brokerage firm that allegedly permitted the bankrupt,
through its office, to participate in large-scale speculations with customers'
funds when the firm knew or should have known of the bankrupt's scheme to
defraud.4 8 This conduct by the brokerage firm allegedly violated the "Know
Your Customer Rule" of the NYSE.4 9 The court held that the rule had been
violated and since rule 405 was aimed at protecting investors, a cause of
action would arise. While the court indicated that mere errors in judgment
would not amount to a violation of the rule, it held that the "callous
disregard" for the rule was tantamount to fraud and thus a private civil
damage action could exist.50 The Buttrey requirement seems to allow the
implication of liability even if the rule violated was very broad, i.e. "some-
thing of a catch-all," so long as the rule was specifically designed to protect
investors. Although the court in Buttrey found for the first time that a
violation of a stock exchange rule could create an implied civil liability on the
part of a member, it also decided that such a violation does not per se create a
cause of action.5 1 Consequently, courts have been forced to decide on a case
by case basis whether a particular rule violation will create a cause of
action.52
These subsequent decisions have narrowed the scope of implied federal
civil liability.5 3 Because the Buttrey court had placed emphasis on the
fraudulent aspect of the rule 405 violation in that case,54 later courts reasoned
that if a violation of stock exchange or dealer association rules" were to be
Colum. L. Rev. 12, 29 (1966). Contra, Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer
for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 253, 275-76 (1970).
48. 410 F.2d at 136-37.
49. Id. at 137 (Rule 405). This rule is an important source of litigation involving violations of
exchange rules. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The rule provides in
pertinent part: "Every member organization is required... to .... (1) Use due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted
or carried by such organization . . . . (2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered
representatives of the organization." 2 CCH NYSE Guide 2405, at 3697 (1975).
50. 410 F.2d at 143. Compare SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (broker dealer failed to supervise).
51. 410 F.2d at 142-43.
52. E.g., Schonholtz v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-92 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd per curiam, 505 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1974); Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,674, at 93,008 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). There have been
similar holdings with regard to the per se non-actionability of NASD rules. E.g., Wells v. Blythe
& Co., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295
F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
53. E.g., Schonholtz v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per
curiam, 505 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1974); McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 93,541 (N.D. Il11 1972); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
92,748 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55. The dealer association rule which is an important source of litigation in this respect Is the
NASD's "suitability rule." E.g., Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
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actionable on an implied liability theory then such violations must involve
some evidence of fraud.5 6 In Buttrey, however, while a finding of fraud was
necessary for a violation of Rule 405, it was not the essential element for a
finding of implied civil liability.5 7 Thus, in Van Gemert even though the rule
allegedly violated did not involve fraud,58 the court, unlike prior cases,59 did
not address the presence or lack of fraud in its discussion of implied civil
liability. It appears, therefore, that the Second Circuit, at least, may not
consider fraud an essential element of implied federal civil liability. 60
Although it may constitute dicta, 6' the court in Van Gemert also reinforced
denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.
Iowa 1975); Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Hecht v. Harris, Uphan & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). This rule,
which parallels NYSE rule 405, provides that: "In recommending to a customer the purchase,
sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by
such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." CCH
NASD Manual 2152 (1968).
56. See Utah & Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Science v. DuPont Walston, Ing..
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,812, at 96,713 (N.D. Utah 1974); Wells
v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1001-02 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McMAster Hutchinson & Co. v.
Rothschild & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,541, at 92,58S (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,748, at 99,274 (N.D. Ill. 1970). But see Avern Trust v.
Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970).
57. 410 F.2d at 142-43; accord SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (Brokerage firm failed to adequately supervise its president's
activities in violation of NASD Rule 27. "We have no doubt that the enforcement [by the firm] of
[President] Nay's rule regarding the opening of mall is sufficient without more to constitute
violation of Rule 27. Such violations provide a basis for private damage actions where the rule
violated serves to protect the public. .. ."); see Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.
1969). Some commentators have also viewed fraud as essential only to the finding of a rule
violation, and not as to implied federal civil liability. Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability
to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 Fordham L Rev. 253,
267 (1970); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member Liability for Violation of Stock
Exchange Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120, 1131 (1970). Wolfson and Russo also suggested that if
fraud is actually present, then there might be a cause of action arising out of section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and SEC rule 10b-5. Id.
58. The allegation evolves from a failure to comply with section A10 of the NYSE Company
Manual as it relates to the listing agreement.
59. E.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 416. U.S. 960 (1974); SEC v.
First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969);
Granberry, Marache & Co. v. E.L. Bruce Co., 62 Misc 2d 406, 308 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. "Ct.
1969).
60. The Second Circuit, in Colonial, did not consider whether fraud is an essential element.
See notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
61. The analysis is dicta because the court in Van Gemert did not pass directly upon the issue
of implied federal civil liability. Id. at 1382.
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previous holdings granting civil liability in certain situations. 62 The court
found two considerations to weigh against the position taken by the lower
court and advanced by the appellees that "a violation of an exchange rule
cannot under any circumstances give rise to civil liability under the federal
acts."'63 First, the court noted that three recent decisions supported its
statement. One decision, in the Southern District of New York, found that a
cause of action arose from a violation of rule 345.17 of the NYSE. 64 The
second, a Seventh Circuit decision, allowed recovery by customers of a
brokerage firm for the firms' violation of the NASD suitability rule that was
designed to protect investors from fraudulent brokerage practices. 65 The
third, a Third Circuit case, while not finding liability for violation of a stock
exchange rule, did acknowledge that under certain circumstances liability
would be appropriate. 66 While these are not statements of the Second Circuit,
they are part of a developing case law that permits, rather than prohibits,
implied causes of action to arise for violations of stock exchange and dealer
association rules. 67 As such they lend support to the Van Gemert courts'
refusal to agree with the lower courts' belief on the issue of implied civil
liability.
Second, the court found it an "inviting" position that to the investing
public, listing on the NYSE carried with it "implicit guarantees of
trustworthiness. '68 From this finding it may be inferred that since the listing
company benefited from its listing agreement with the NYSE, it should accept
the responsibility that a violation of exchange rules may give rise to civil
liability because of the guarantees of trustworthiness of the listing agreement.
This reflects the shingle theory of broker dealer liability. 69 Moreover, the
62. The fact that the court examined an alleged violation of a stock exchange rule not
previously considered in any other judicial proceeding also seems to expand the area in which
implied federal civil liability can be applied.
63. Id. at 1381; see Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 94,325 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364
(1975).
64. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Rule 345.17 provides In pertinent
part that "each registered representative, in consideration of the Exchange's approving his
application, shall sign the following statements: (A) That I will not guarantee to my employer or
to any other creditor carrying a customer's account, the payment of the debit balance In such
account, without the prior written consent of the Exchange. (B) That I will not guarantee any
customer against loss in his account or in any way represent to any customer that I or my
employer will guarantee the customer against such losses. (C) That I will not take or receive,
directly or indirectly, a share in the profits of any customer's account, or share in any lossess
sustained in any such account." 2 CCH NYSE Guide 2345.17, at 3595 (1975).
65. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); see note
55 supra.
66. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 164-66 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)
(NYSE rule 405); see note 49 supra.
67. But see Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
68. 520 F.2d at 1381.
69. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1483 (2d ed. 1961) ("The theory is that even a dealer at
arm's length impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that he will deal fairly with the
public.")
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court's reliance on the recent decisions as well as its articulation of the shingle
theory seem more favorable to the Buttrey mode of analysis in that the thrust
of the inquiry seems to be whether the particular rule in question is for the
direct protection of investors.70
The defendants in Van Gemert argued that violations of an exchange rule
did not give rise to implied civil liability for two reasons.7 1 First, they argued
that the self-regulatory scheme of the NYSE applied only to members7 2 of the
Exchange rather than to issuers7 3 because Congressional intent so declared.7 4
The court rejected this argument noting that Congress did not adopt a
proposed extension of the 1934 Act requiring listing companies to comply with
exchange rules. 75 The legislative history was "at most equivocal on the
question" because debate on the proposed amendment had centered on
whether such a provision was necessary at all since listing companies might
have to "comply with the law regardless of any such agreement.7 6 Second,
defendants argued that the Exchange's remedies are limited to delisting."7
The court rejected this argument because no authority has held that delisting
of a company is the exclusive remedy available for violation of stock exchange
rules.7 8 It is arguable, however, that the listing agreement binding issuers is
not a rule binding members. The court did not establish the nexus between
the listing agreement and the NYSE rules.79 The courtes decision seems to
expand the theory of implied federal civil liability to include violations of
exchange rules by issuers as well as members.
Im. NOTICE TO DEBENTURE-HOLDERS CONCERNING REDEMPTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not set forth the duty of an
issuing company to notify the holder of the security when it redeems its
70. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
71. 520 F.2d at 1382; Brief for Appellees at 40-44, Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975).
72. See note 23 supra.
73. An issuer is "any person who issues or proposes to issue any security . . . (Tihe term
'issuer' means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or
manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which
such securities are issued . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aX8) (1970).
74. 520 F.2d at 1382; Brief for Appellees at 44, Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975).
75. 520 F.2d at 1382.
76. Id.; see 78 Cong. Rec. 8584-86 (1934).
77. The argument made by the appellees was based upon the Report of the Special Study of
Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. IV, at 566-67 (1963); see Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452
F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) (delisting permissible); Brief for the
Appellees at 40-42, Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F. 2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
364 (1975).
78. 520 F.2d at 1382.
79. See DeRenzis v. Levy, 297 F. Supp. 998, 999-1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (contract between
NYSE member firm and individual adviser not a NYSE rule).
80. Karl E. Sommerlatte, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,557
(1971).
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convertible debentures.80 Thus the duty must arise from the contract between
the holder and the issuing company, formulated pursuant to the indenture,
the listing agreement, or from some other source that courts find reasonable.
If the issuing company fails to comply with the notice requirements
contained in the indenture, then it is liable for breach of contract. But even if
the issuing company does provide the investor with such notice, there might
be implied federal civil liability based upon the company's failure to provide
the requisite notice pursuant to its listing agreement with the stock exchange.
Where, however, a court as in Van Gemert, does not pass directly on the
question of implied civil liability,81 it may still reach a decision on the
reasonableness of the notice given without regard to the requirements of the
indenture.8 2
In one case, a New York court held that publication of a redemption notice
in a daily financial newspaper, i.e., the Wall Street Journal, met the re-
quirement that the notice be published in a newspaper of general cir-
culation.8 3 The court, reasoning by analogy, believed that since the
information to be published was of a financial nature, then publication of the
redemption notice in the Wall Street Journal was proper because it was used
more than any other newspaper for the publication of such notices.8 4
In Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc.,"5 plaintiff failed to convert his debentures
within the time allotted for redemption.8 6 Notices of the redemption call were
mailed only to those holders who had registered their securities when pur-
chasing them. Plaintiff had not so registered. Following a press release,
defendant's redemption call had been published in several sources.8 7 But the
plaintiff did not see these notices. He contended that the debenture itself was
misleading and deceptive because it failed to mention the issuer's right to
redeem its holdings in the same large size print that was used to write the
words "convertible." Yet the court concluded that the key factor in the
plaintiff's failure to convert was not the differing sizes of print, but rather the
plaintiff's unreasonable behavior in not investigating those aspects of the
debenture which he did not understand. The information the plaintiff sought
81. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
82. 520 F.2d at 1383-86.
83. Gampel v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 846, 252 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (all
other newspapers in New York City were on strike at the time notice was published).
84. Id. at 848, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
85. 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. 11. 1971). Plaintiff purchaser occasionally invested in common
stock prior to his purchase of the debentures. He was advised by a broker that the debentures
were a good investment, but at no time did he see the prospectus or the trust indenture. Nor did
the plaintiff investigate any aspect of the debentures, their ratings or the defendant company. In a
superficial examination of the debentures he discovered that he was not sure of the meaning of
"convertible," and while he did not understand the terms "redeemable" or "callable," he did not
search out the meaning. Id. at 213.
86. Of over five million dollars worth of debentures only $155,800 were not converted. Id.
87. The sources were the Wall Street Journal, Women's Wear Daily, Daily News Record,
Homes Furnishings Daily, and the Reuters and Dow-Jones Wire Services. Id.
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was on the face of the debenture. 88 The court, employing the reasonable man
test, denied the plaintiff's claim 89
The court in Abramson v. Burroughs Corp.,90 considered a similar claim by
an investor who failed to convert within the redemption period. Notice to
registered debenture holders was also made by mail. 9 1 Plaintiff claimed that
the notice provisions of the prospectus were misleading because they omitted
the nature and the frequency of the notice which the investors would receive,
"thus leading [them] to buy the bonds in the belief that [they] would receive
sufficient notice prior to redemption to allow [them] to convert [their] bonds
. . "92 However, the court disagreed, pointing out that the prospectus
specifically stated that both bonds were redeemable on thirty days notice. The
court found further that the information contained in the prospectus was
incomplete. 93 But the factor fatal to the plaintiff's claim was that .he
debentures contained all the information which an investor needed on their
face. 94 Defendant, Burroughs Corp., had a right to believe that bond pur-
chasers familiarize themselves with the conditions of issuance by reading the
"few short paragraphs on the face of the bond."9S Thus, Burroughs' notice to
the investor was reasonable.
In both Abramson and Kaplan the standard adopted by the courts seemed
to be that of the reasonable man. In Kaplan, for example, the investor was
deemed to have acted unreasonably for his failure to investigate information
concerning the debentures which he did not understand. The information that
the investor lacked in Abramson and Kaplan appeared on the face of the
debentures. Thus those courts ruled that the investor was unreasonable in not
being aware of that which was clear. The criterion of reasonableness used in
88. Id. at 215-16. The title on the debentures read: "5% Convertible Subordinated Debenture
Due March 1, 1982." The remainder of the printing on the debentures was much smaller. It was
in the "fine print" that the right to redeem appeared. Id. at 213-14.
89. Id. at 215-16. As a sidelight, the court also found that the words "at least thirty days
published notice" did not mean notice published on thirty consecutive days. Id. at 217.
90. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
91. Id. at 92,253. The Indenture called for publication by at least four newspapers, two in
New York City and two in Detroit. Id.
92. Id. at 92,254.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. "The bonds specifically state 'Notice of redemption shall be given by publication at
least four times, each publication to be made in at least two newspapers printed in the English
language and customarily published at least once a day for at least five days in each calendar
week and of general circulation, one in the Borough of Manhattan, The City of New York, and
one in Detroit, Michigan, the first such publication to be not less than thirty nor more than sixty
days prior to the date fixed for redemption, all as provided in the Indenture. Notice of redemption
shall also be given to the registered holder of Debentures registered as to principal to be redeemed
as a whole or in part by mailing a notice of such redemption not less than thirty nor more than
sixty days prior to the date fixed for redemption to their last addresses as they shall appear upon
the registry books, all as provided in the Indenture, but failure to give such notice by mail, or any
defect therein, shall not affect the validity of the proceedings for the redemption of any of the
Debentures."' Id.
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these cases to judge investor action could as easily have been applied to the
notification standards required of an issuing corporation. This was the case in
Van Gemert.
The court in Van Gemert, going beyond the requirements of the listing
agreement, found two basic failings in the notice given by Boeing. 96 First, the
debenture holders were not adequately appraised of what notice would be
provided by the redemption call. 9 7 Secondly, the newspaper publication was
insufficient because it did not give the holders "fair and reasonable notice." 98
The court emphasized that, on their face, the debentures themselves con-
tained no information about the benefits of registration.99 The 113 page
indenture was the only place where Boeing stated that an investor who had
registered his debenture was entitled to notice of redemption by mail. The
court found that it was not the investor who was unreasonable in failing to
read the indenture. Rather it was the issuing corporation which was
unreasonable for placing the notice only in the indenture. 100
What one buys when purchasing a convertible debenture in addition to the debt
obligation of the company incurred thereby is principally the expectation that the stock
will increase sufficiently in value that the conversion right will make the debenture
worth more than the debt. The debenture holder relies on the opportunity to make a
proper conversion on due notice. Any loss occurring to him from failure to convert, as
here, is not from a risk inherent in his investment but rather from unsatisfactory
notification procedures. The debenture holder's expectancy is that he will receive
reasonable notice and it is his reliance on this expectancy that the courts will protect.
Had there been proper publication, a reasonable investor undoubtedly would have
taken action to prevent the loss occurring to him.' 0'
Proper notification, as implied in the Van Gemert decision, means personal
notice to the investor by mail, or notice of the manner in which he will be
notified, or notice of the means by which he can assure himself of receiving
written personal notice.
Typically, a company wishing to notify coupon bondholders of an
impending redemption call must publish such notice once a week for four
weeks in an authorized newspaper.' 0 2 This is necessary since a coupon
bond is a bearer bond, as distinguished from a registered bond which has no
attached interest coupons, and requires publication rather than mailing since
the issuer does not know the name and address of the bearer. 0 3 The notice
96. 520 F.2d at 1383.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
99. 520 F.2d at 1383. Compare note 95 supra.
100. 520 F.2d at 1383-84. The court also found that Boeing was unreasonable since it knew
of the redemption call at the time it sent out proxy statements to its shareholders, yet made no
effort to inform the debenture holders of the redemption. Id. at 1384. However, if the debenture
holder was not a shareholder, this notice would not have been helpful.
101. Id. at 1385 (citations omitted).
102. Cornell Note, supra note 7, at 278; see American Bar Foundation Corporate Debt
Financing Project, Model Debenture Provisions § 1105, at 73 (1965).
103. H. Henn, Corporations § 156, at 286-87 (2d ed. 1970).
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usually has to be published from thirty to sixty days prior to the redemption
date. 104 However, this procedure has been attacked as being inadequate and
unconscionable because of the alleged gross inequality of the parties' bargain-
ing powers.10 5 But the part of the procedure which requires those who have
registered their bonds to receive notice by mail has not been so criticized. 10 6
It would seem, therefore, that the courts may require that an issuing
company print, on the face of its debentures, both the procedures for an
investor registering his debentures and the benefits for so doing, i.e., mail
notice, as well as the manner in which the company will give notice to those
who do choose not to register their debentures. 0 7 One financial analyst
believes that "a company that redeems should go out of its way to notify
shareholders. As a minimum the company should write a person a letter ....
They can telephone those security holders who do not respond. We have
known many companies that have gone that far."' 08 The court in Van Gemert
indicated, however, that it would be reluctant to grant relief to an investor
who has not read the debenture he purchased. 10 9 Other demands regarding
publication of notice that may be made upon the issuing company will
probably be more flexible." 0
A corporation may be able to avoid the litigation problems encountered by
Boeing if when giving notice to its debenture holders, it takes extreme care to
include on the face of its debentures more details regarding redemption and
conversion. If the corporation has outstanding debentures similar to Boeing's,
it may avoid liability in the event of a future redemption call by revising the
face of the security to include notice of the benefits of registration and other
items essential to the investor. However, this could be expensive since it
requires an amendment of the indenture, a reprinting of the debenture, and
an offer to exchange existing debentures for the new ones. Moreover, it could
be ineffectual since the present holder of the debenture may not be aware of
their ability to exchange their securities for the new ones with the adequate
notice. The exchange process suffers from the same notice deficiences as the
original notice of redemption. However, this might prompt a court to be more
lenient towards a corporation that has made such a good faith effort.
104. Cornell Note, supra note 7, at 278; American Bar Foundation Corporate Debt Financing
Project, Model Debenture Provisions § 1105, at 73 (1965).
105. Cornell Note, supra note 7, at 279; see note 12 supra.
106. Cornell Note, supra note 7, at 279.
107. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1383-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
364 (1975).
108. N.Y. Times, August 3, 1975, § 3 (Business & Finance), at 6, col. 4.
109. 520 F.2d at 1384 n.20.
110. See id. at 1384-85. These requirements deal mainly with the number of times during the
redemption period when newspaper notice should be published, the size of the advertisements,
their placement in the newspaper itself, the number of newspapers in which the notice will be
published and in what other sources will such notice be found. As to press releases, the minimal
requirements would seem to be those set forth by the NYSE. See NYSE Company Manual
§ Al, at A-170 (1971).
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IV. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
A third party beneficiary claim is the final theory upon which corporate
liability may be predicated.' 11 The corporation's failure to abide by the notice
provisions set forth in the listing agreement is a breach of its contract with the
Stock Exchange. The debenture holder therefore may be able to sue the
corporation for its breach of the agreement as a third party beneficiary.
In Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange, 1 2 the court held that an
investor may recover as a third-party beneficiary of an agreement between the
SEC and a registered national securities exchange. "13 Normally, an individual
not a party to a contract, who derives benefits from it, may not recover for its
breach. "14 However, a third party may recover for a breach of contract if the
parties to the contract intended that he benefit from the agreement."15
Otherwise a third party is only an "incidental" beneficiary of the contract
regardless of whether it benefits him and accordingly he cannot recover in the
event of a breach." 6 In Weinberger the complainant was an investor seeking
damages from the NYSE for the Exchange's alleged failure to supervise its
member firms adequately in violation of its agreement with the SEC. The
court found that the Exchange's agreement with the SEC made the investor
more than just an "incidental" beneficiary of the contract. 117 Since the
agreement was aimed at benefiting the investor directly, it conferred upon
him the status of "intended" beneficiary" 8 and permitted him to sue for the
breach of contract.
111. Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
12, 25 (1966).
112. 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
113. Id. at 144.
114. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 244 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Calamari & Perillo];
4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 733 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Corbin]; 2 S. Williston, Contracts § 347
(3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Williston].
115. Seaver v. Ransom, 22,4 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268
(1859); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 114, § 244; Corbin, supra note 114, § 776; Williston, supra
note 114, § 356.
116. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
117. 335 F. Supp. at 144. "If we apply the Congressional intent found in Baird v. Franklin
[141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944)] to the agreement by the Exchange, that
agreement must be read as being for the benefit of investors. We come to the conclusion,
therefore, that the policy of federal law, as interpreted in the Second Circuit, makes an investor
more than an incidental beneficiary of the contract mandated by an Act of Congress. It gives him
an independent claim for relief." Id. (footnote omitted). But cf. Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4,
8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Homblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364,
1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
118. Originally the term used to describe this type of beneficiary was "donee," and the
category of third-parties to which it applied was very limited. Corbin, supra note 114, § 782;
Williston, supra note 114, § 357. But through the years the category has expanded, see Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 114, § 244; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973); Gould v. Pollack, 68 Misc. 2d 670, 677-78, 327 N.Y.S.2d 808, 816 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 71 Misc. 2d 344, 335 N.Y.S.2d 840 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1972), to the point
where the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has done away with the word donee because its
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The Maryland Court of Appeals in Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., "19
found that the provision of a listing agreement that is breached must be
designed to benefit the particular person or class of persons who are suing as
third party beneficiaries.120 The key factor in determining whether a third
party may claim under a contract is the intent of the promisee. Where the
promisee manifests a direct intent, either expressly or impliedly, to have a
third party benefit from his agreement with the promisor, then the third party
may recover for a breach of contract as a result of his "intended" beneficiary
status. 121 The court in Mackubin did not allow the third party beneficiary
claim based upon the company's failure to publish prompt notice with respect
to dividends on shares as required by the listing agreement because the
plaintiff was suing as a prospective purchaser of the company's stock.
Plaintiff was not in the class of persons which the listing agreement require-
ments were designed to protect. In Weinberger, the SEC, as promisee of its
agreement with the stock exchange, intended to have the investor benefit from
the Exchange's promise to regulate its member firms. Here, the stock
exchange, as promisee of its agreement with the corporation, did not intend
for a prospective purchaser of the corporation's stock to derive the benefit
from a provision requiring the company to publish prompt notice with respect
to dividends. While the court did not comment on whom the provision was
designed to benefit, it seems that current shareholders were the intended
recipients.
It has been suggested that a third party beneficiary claim by an investor is
possible when a stock exchange member breaches his agreement with the
Exchange by violating one of the Exchange rules. 122 This conclusion is based
upon the belief that the agreement between a stock exchange and its members
is made for the benefit of investors. 23 By extending this analysis and that of
Weinberger and Mackubin, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the
breach of a listing agreement will permit a third party beneficiary claim under
certain circumstances, depending upon the requirements of the particular
provision violated.' 24 Generally, the listing agreement is designed to protect
connotation is too restrictive and instead has substituted the term "intended." Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 133 (Introductory Note and Reporter's Note) (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973).
119. 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318 (1948).
120. Id. at 54, 57 A.2d at 321.
121. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 114, § 244; Corbin, supra note 114, §§ 776-77; Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
122. Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 825, 839-40 (1970). Rules of the stock exchange automatically become part of this agreement
unless expressly agreed otherwise. E.g., 2 CCH NYSE Guide 1551 (1972).
123. Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 825, 839-40 (1970).
124. Judge Oakes suggested in a footnote to Van Gemert that a debenture holder was a third
party beneficiary to the listing agreement. He believed that since the duty of a listed company is
to treat its own security holders fairly, and since security holders can be viewed as creditors of the
corporation, then they can be deemed creditor beneficiaries of the listing agreement and thus
recover for its breach. 520 F.2d at 1382-83 n.19. However, in order to create a creditor
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the investor from certain conduct of the issuing company.125 Listing
agreements require timely disclosure, to both the public and the exchange, of
all corporate information which may "affect security values or influence
investment decisions, and in which stockholders, the public and the Exchange
have a warrantable interest .... ,126 Other requirements made upon the
issuing company also reflect the investor protection function of the listing
agreement. 127 This is especially true with respect to the notice that the
company is requested to provide to the investor in the event of a redemption
call.1 28 Thus, while an aggrieved investor may not have standing as a creditor
beneficiary of the listing agreement, as Judge Oakes suggested in a footnote to
the Van Gemert decision,1 29 an argument can be made that he has standing as
an "intended" beneficiary of such a contract.1 30
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that the failure of an issuing corporation to provide its con-
vertible debenture holders with proper and sufficient notice of an impending
beneficiary the promisee must enter into the contract with the promisor for the purpose of
discharging an obligation which the promisee owes, or thinks he owes, to the beneficiary.
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 114, § 244; Corbin, supra note 114, § 787; Williston, supra note
114, § 361. Consequently, investors in debentures may only recover as creditor beneficiaries If
there is an obligation running from the promisee of the listing agreement directly to them. Thus,
the issuing company must be the promisee of the particular applicable provisions of the listing
agreement. Where the provision of the listing agreement that is allegedly violated is one In which
the issuing corporation promises to provide specific types of notice to its security holders, see note
128 infra, then the company is the promisor of the agreement and the exchange is the promlsee.
Therefore, investors may not be creditor beneficiaries of the listing agreement as it relates to
notice because any alleged obligation emanates from the issuing corporation and not from the
stock exchange.
125. 78 Cong. Rec. 8586 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Steiwer). Senator Byrnes stated- "I am told
that in the State of New York, where most of these agreements will be made ... a contract made
for a consideration for the benefit of a third person is sustained at law. This agreement is made
between the issuing corporation and the commission [SEC] and the exchange. In my opinion, (the
listing agreement] is made for the benefit of a third person, namely, the investor. Undoubtedly
certain remedies inhere in this agreement in favor of that third person." Id.
126. NYSE Company Manual § A2, at A-28 (1971).
127. Id. at A-29 to -34.
128. Id. at A-34. "The Corporation will publish immediately to the holders of any of Its
securities listed on the Exchange any action taken by the Corporation with respect to dividends or
to the allotment of rights to subscribe or to any rights or benefits pertaining to the ownership of its
securities listed on the Exchange; and will give prompt notice to the Exchange of any such action;
and will afford the holders of its securities listed on the-Exchange a proper period within which to
record their interests and to exercise their rights; and will issue all such rights or benefits in form
approved by the Exchange and will make the same transferable, exercisable, payable and
deliverable in the Borough of Manhattan in the City of New York." Id.
129. See note 124 supra.
130. This conclusion is made recognizing that the debenture provisions arising out of the
holder's purchase of the security from the issuing company are viewed as a specie of contract.
Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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redemption call may give rise to corporate liability on any of three theories:13 1
implied federal civil liability, lack of proper and sufficient notice, or third
party beneficiary.
Under the first theory, liability may be based upon either the Colonial or
Buttrey test. The emphasis of subsequent courts upon fraud as an essential
element of implied civil liability under Buttrey seems to have been
undermined. If the rule violated can be considered an integral part of SEC
regulations and an extension of the federal regulatory scheme, as required by
Colonial, or if it is precise and aimed at protecting the customer, as required
by Buttrey, then implied federal civil liability can be predicated on such a
rule.' 32 As between the two tests however, the Van Genert decision would
seem to indicate an implied acceptance of the Buttrey test. This may result in
the bifurcation of exchange rules when future courts decide whether to imply
a federal civil cause of action for violations of stock exchange or dealer
association rules. Rules designed for the direct benefit and protection of the
investor may support liability and those that are merely "housekeeping"
regulations may not 133 because they do not represent an extension of the
investor protection function of the 1934 Act. 34 However, the Achilles heel of
the Van Gemert decision may be that it did not establish a nexus between a
listing agreement and a NYSE rule. Unless such a relationship is shown,
liability under this theory should fail.
Under the second theory, the plaintiff's case will be dependent upon what
type of notice is provided to him. Different courts will reach different
decisions based upon the various fact patterns. The doctrine of reasonableness
will play an important role in the court's evaluation of particular cases. The
knowledge and opportunity of an investor to receive his notice of redemption
by mail may be the crucial factor upon which a case turns. Yet, in any event,
Van Gemert may prompt a modification of corporations' notification
procedures. Indeed, one financial commentator has stated that, as a con-
sequence of Van Gemert, "corporate attitudes appear to be changing in favor
of the security holder." 35 Pro forma notification may no longer be sufficient.
131. The debentures must be listed on a national securities stock exchange. Otherwise, there
would be no statutory scheme from which to imply federal civil liability. See notes 13-15 supra
and accompanying text. Neither would there be a listing agreement upon which to predicate third
party beneficiary liability. See note 13 supra and text accompanying note I I I supra. Only the
second cause of action, reasonableness of notice, may still be maintained.
132. See Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
133. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 Colum. L.
Rev. 12, 28-29 (1966). The author distinguishes rules which he feels can be classified as either
"housekeeping" or "investor protection" rules.
134. In Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), Judge
Clark pointed out that one of the primary purposes of the 1934 Act was to protect the general
investing public. Id. at 244 & n.4 (dissenting opinion). In support of this proposition he set forth
thirty-six sections of the Act which contained references to the Act's investor protection function.
Id.; see Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
12, 24 (1966); MacLean, Broker's Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47
Denver L.J. 63, 77 (1970).
135. N.Y. Times, August 3, 1975, § 3 (Business & Finance), at 6, col. 4.
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The process will now be carried out with care and a considerable degree of
foresight.
Under the third theory, recovery will depend upon whether the particular
requirement of the listing agreement that is not complied with was designed
for the benefit of those security holders suing for its breach. In this sense a
third party beneficiary claim will closely parallel one based on implied civil
liability. In order to succeed, a third party must bring his action based upon a
rule or regulation that will characterize him as an "intended" beneficiary. This
can only occur if the rule or regulation was promulgated for the direct benefit
and protection of the investor. Otherwise, the investor would be merely an
incidental beneficiary, and as such will have no basis for a claim.
Andrew Macdonald
